The hopeful among us would like to believe in the possibility of moral conversion.
I will examine three cases of apparent moral conversion, engage in the interpretation of the agents' motives, and draw some speculative conclusions about moral conversion. The first case is from a film about a fictional drab functionary of the East German regime who ends up trying to save the people he is assigned to spy upon. The film expresses our very human hopes for the possibility of conversion, but I shall discuss questions that critics have raised about its plausibility. My discussion shall lead to the second case: the real-life story of Oskar Schindler, who is credited with saving the lives of over a thousand Jews during the Nazi occupation of Poland. Schindler's conversion highlights the effects of repeated exposure to evil and the way his independence from authority structures, together with his charming and roguish character, may have suited him for the role of deceiving, cajoling, and bribing Nazi officials in order to save lives.
The third is about a leader of the Ku Klux Klan who improbably worked and became friends with a militant black activist during the desegregation of the Durham, North Carolina public schools. The Klan leader's desire for social acceptance, independence of mind and fundamental decency (and I am very surprised to be writing these words!) play a key role in his conversion. I will weave reflections taken from these works with theoretical and empirical work on the nature of emotion and its relation to cognitive and perceptual capacities. We may not know enough to draw definitive conclusions about the possibility of moral conversion and how it works, but there is enough for some speculation that bears further investigation.
A fictional Stasi man
The recent film The Lives of Others is about Gerd Wiesler, who works for the Stasi, the secret police of East Germany. Wiesler is assigned to find incriminating 3 material on a prominent playwright and a distinguished actress who is the playwright's lover. He listens to their conversations, telephone calls, and lovemaking. Gradually he undergoes a transformation and tries to protect the couple from exposure to his own organization. We are left to infer what could have brought about such a change. Wiesler is depicted as a tightly self-controlled, by-the-book functionary who believes in the necessity and importance of his job. However, he learns that a government official requested his assignment to the case so that the official can have the playwright's lover for himself. The result for Wiesler is disillusionment with the Stasi and with his own role as the cats paw of a powerful man motivated by nothing more than grubby lust. He appears to be an excruciatingly lonely man with an eroding rationale for the job that gave purpose to his life. In this condition, it appears plausible that he is moved by the purpose of the people he is assigned spy upon. The imagined case of Wiesler illustrates clearly that aspect of moral conversion that parallels religious conversion: one who has lost the only thing that gave meaning to his life finds new meaning in protecting those who are living out an alternative to the ideology of the regime. He eavesdrops on the playing of a "Sonata for a Good Man," of which it is said that no one who really listens to it cannot be but a good man, and he comes to have feelings for the actress that are mixed with the instinct to comfort and protect her. In the end, his efforts to protect the couple end very badly for the actress, but the playwright discovers Wiesler's efforts to protect them when the East German regime collapses and Stasi surveillance records are made available to their victims. The film ends with Wiesler finding a book written by the playwright, dedicated to a "Good Man." When asked by the clerk whether he wants the book wrapped as a gift, Wiesler smiles and says, "It's for me."
An author of a book on the Stasi, Anna Funder, argues in an essay on the film that it is a beautiful fantasy that could not have happened. One of her reasons is that totalitarian systems control their own agents through internal surveillance and division of tasks. Rather than assigning surveillance to a primary agent and a subordinate, as depicted in the film, the assignment is to many agents, each of whom is charged only with a piece of the total operation; each piece of information is checked and crosschecked. No individual Stasi agent could have fooled the system in the way Wiesler did.
Another of Funder's reasons for thinking the movie's events impossible is that in her experience no Stasi man ever wanted to save people from the system. Institutional coercion made them all into "true believers; it shrank their consciences and heightened their tolerance for injustice and cruelty 'for the cause'." The director of the film, Florian
Henckel von Donnersmarck, responded to such criticisms by saying that he did not want to tell a true story but rather to express belief in humanity and explore how someone might have behaved. In his "Director's statement" that accompanied press releases for the film, Donnersmarck wrote, "More than anything else, The Lives of Others is a human drama about the ability of human beings to do the right thing, no matter how far they have gone down the wrong path." Funder replied: "This is an uplifting thought. But what is more likely to save us from going down the wrong path again is recognising how human beings can be trained and forced into faceless systems of oppression, in which conscience is extinguished." Von Donnersmarck cited Schindler's List as a justification for his own film. But Funder quotes Dr. Hubertus Knabe, director of the memorial museum about the former East German regime, as commenting, "There was a Schindler.
There was no Wiesler." 2 
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The factors that Funder cites indeed seem to reduce the possibility of a real-life Wiesler, and they are not unrelated. The coercive, diminishing effects of an institution like the Stasi is heightened by mechanisms that reduce knowledge of what one is really doing, and at the same time, exacts a high cost on indulging one's curiosity. Even the relatively optimistic movie portrays an incident about the constant vigilance for the wrong attitudes that pervaded the Stasi agency. An agent, in a relaxed, joking moment, starts to tell a joke about the government. When he hesitates upon realizing that a superior is listening, he is encouraged to finish the joke and is made to feel that it all will be taken in good humor. The viewer later finds out that the joke was really on the agent when he and a by-then disgraced Wiesler find themselves together in the basement of a Stasi building, performing the mindless task of steaming envelopes open.
Work in psychology on the influence of situations on individuals' behavior would seem to support the pessimistic side of the argument about The Lives of Others. Subjects of the famous Milgram experiments were led to believe that they were taking part in an investigation of the effects of escalating electric shocks administered to a "learner" (who was hired by the experimenters to play the role) every time he gave a wrong answer to a test of learning and memory. The shocks were not real, but the learner, who deliberately kept making mistakes, acted as if the shocks were real and increasingly painful, up to voltage levels marked "danger: severe shock" and "xxx." In Milgram's first set of experiments, 65 percent of experiment participants administered the maximum voltage shock, though many were extremely uncomfortable doing so; at some point, every participant paused and questioned the experiment, some said they would refund the money they were paid for participating in the experiment. Only one participant 6 steadfastly refused to administer shocks before the 300-volt level. Milgram gives a revealing summary of the experiment:
I set up a simple experiment at Yale University to test how much pain an ordinary citizen would inflict on another person simply because he was ordered to by an experimental scientist. Stark authority was pitted against the subjects'
[participants'] strongest moral imperatives against hurting others, and, with the subjects' [participants'] ears ringing with the screams of the victims, authority won more often than not. The extreme willingness of adults to go to almost any lengths on the command of an authority constitutes the chief finding of the study and the fact most urgently demanding explanation.
Ordinary people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part, can become agents in a terrible destructive process.
Moreover, even when the destructive effects of their work become patently clear, and they are asked to carry out actions incompatible with fundamental standards of morality, relatively few people have the resources needed to resist authority. 3 More recently, in Philip Zimbardo's Stanford Prison experiment, Stanford undergraduates played the roles of prisoners and guards in a mock prison. The students quickly internalized their roles to the extent that one-third of the "guards" were judged to have exhibited genuine sadistic tendencies and many "prisoners" suffered emotional trauma. Zimbardo ended the experiment early, but only after a graduate student (who was later to become his wife) voiced strenuous moral objections to the experiment. The similarities between the experiment and the torture and abuse that occurred in Abu 7 Ghraib during the Iraq War were not lost on Zimbardo, who testified in defense of one of the prosecuted prison guards. 4 Some philosophers have used studies such as the Milgram and Stanford Prison experiments to question the viability of traditional ethical ideals of cultivating a stable good character. They argue that human character traits are liable to be extremely situation-sensitive and hence that our ethical behavior is highly dependent on having the right sort of context. 5 But there were subjects in the Milgram experiment who disobeyed the authority figure, and student "guards" in the Stanford experiment who did not behave sadistically. Milgram himself offered an explanation of the unexpected frequency of compliance to authority in his experiments, which was the adaptive value of the capacity to fit into social hierarchy. This capacity, on Milgram's view, is activated when a person is placed under certain circumstances; e.g., perception of a legitimate authority that seems relevant to the situation at hand (an experimenter in a white lab coat who greets participants in the experiment and explains what is to be done), the absence of a competing authority, and entry into the authority system (entry into a laboratory, a space the experimenter seems to "own"). 6 Contrary to the radical situationist claim that there are no character traits, 7 Milgram's own explanation of the willingness to administer painful and apparently dangerous electric shocks suggests a kind of trait that evolutionary theory might lead us to expect in human beings. The trait of willingness to fit into a social hierarchy is activated under certain kinds of conditions, and understanding those conditions might lead us to a greater understanding of why some people disobeyed the experimenter and stopped administering shocks to the "bad" learner.
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The one person who disobeyed and stopped before administering 300 volts is vividly portrayed as an extremely fastidious, crusty instructor of the "Old Testament" at a major divinity school. He is one of the few to question the experimenter's claim that it is "absolutely essential" to go on administering the shocks and that there would be "no permanent tissue damage" to the "learner." Moreover, he does not so much question the necessity of obedience to some authority, but at one point declares that he will "take orders" from the "learner" to stop, and when he later is told the point of the experiment and is asked how most effectively to strengthen resistance to inhumane authority, he answers that taking God as the ultimate authority will trivialize human authority. The debate over the plausibility of The Lives of Others, however, draws attention to the importance of how situations interact with character traits and how they might constrain action that might otherwise follow from certain traits. Recall Funder's point that institutional coercion "shrank" the consciences of Stasi agents to the extent that she never encountered one who ever wanted to save people from the system. That institutional coercion was especially potent in its effect on agents in whom the motivation to fit into social hierarchy was already strong. And for those agents in whom the motivation was weaker, the internal surveillance of the Stasi agency provided the incentive of self-preservation. where he employed over 1,000 Jewish workers, most of whom survived the war. 13 By the time Schindler began to plan this transfer to Brünnlitz, Crowe writes, he was fully committed to saving not only the workers from his own factory but also those from other factories. Crowe states that it is difficult to pinpoint a moment when Schindler's sole or primary motivation was to protect his Jewish workers. At last Schindler slithered from his horse, tripped, and found himself on his knees hugging the trunk of a pine tree. The urge to throw up his excellent breakfast was, he sensed, to be suppressed, for he suspected it meant that all his cunning body was doing was making room to digest the horrors of Krakusa Street.
Later in the day, after he had absorbed a ration of brandy, Oscar understood ... However, a slower, deliberate, and conscious mode of processing can occur in the process of having an emotion. It can take place subsequent to the initial fast response to something or someone, and can result in a reappraisal of the object of emotion, in the form of specific discriminations of the way or the degree to which the object is something to be feared, for example. It may involve complex forms of reflection involving the self ("Why am I feeling this way?" or "What's out there that's causing me to react like this?"). This slower track can result in conscious choice of a mode of action or a modification of the mode of action that is tightly connected to the fast response (an involuntary startle response to a loud bang may lead to an auditory and visual scanning of the environment for possible sources of threat and to a decision to take cover).
Keneally's description of Schinder's watching the slaughter with "terror in his blood" and then slithering down from his horse to hug a tree, ready to throw up his breakfast is a vivid way to convey the bodily response to an event with such horrifying emotional impact. His reluctance to yield to the urge to throw up is a reluctance to absorb more of the horror into his body. This component is based on the feeling of bodily changes, a "somatic marker," that gets associated with representations of scenarios that pose possible courses of action. For example, Damasio asks you to imagine being a business owner who must decide to meet with a possible client. The possible client can bring valuable business but also is the archenemy of your best friend. In considering whether to meet or not, multiple imaginary scenes flash in and out of your imagination: being seen in the client's company by your best friend and placing your friendship in jeopardy; not meeting and preserving the friendship, and so forth. Damasio's view is that you resolve the impasse not by performing a cost/benefit calculation on the available action options, but by responding to the gut feelings you experience, say, when you imagine your friend's face as he sees you with his archenemy. 19 The association of these gut feelings with imagined scenarios is a product of your individual learning, say, from the consequences of past acts of violation of trust. Somatic markers eliminate some options from consideration altogether, disadvantage some in relation to others, and highlight others in a positive manner.
According to Damasio, the gut feelings themselves do not come from deliberation.
Indeed, if they did, they could not serve one of their primary functions of reducing the array of options we have to consciously consider and evaluate. Relative to all that the world throws at us, the amount of information and options that our working memories can hold in conscious awareness at any given time is pitifully small. Somatic markers help us to evaluate information and options beneath the level of conscious awareness.
In the light of Damasio's theory of somatic markers, Keneally's dramatization seems apt. In particular, the option of not doing anything about the slaughter became marked by violently sickening bodily changes. It made not doing anything an option that was "silenced," one that could not be considered. John McDowell has written perceptively on the way that a virtue in a person might manifest itself in certain reasons "silencing" other considerations, rather than outweighing or overriding them.
Considerations that would otherwise provide an agent with reasons for action thus lack practical significance when set against the considerations to which virtue requires that one attend. 20 Being a good friend, then, might involve negative affective valence getting attached to the thought of betraying one's friend and silencing the thought of financial gain, rather than merely outweighing or overriding it in a conscious cost-benefit calculation. To be a good friend, in other words, certain actions toward one's friend become unthinkable-it makes one sick to one's stomach to think of doing them.
Damasio's somatic maker theory might help to explain why the negative valence attached to betrayal might silence an otherwise significant consideration of financial gain.
McDowell's example combines two powerful primal motivations that can be turned toward moral ends in human beings. The first motivation is attachment. Studies of the physiological mechanisms that might underlie an emotional concern for others have identified a role for the neurohormone oxytocin. In animals, oxytocin facilitates attachment to offspring, and between monogamous mammals and cohabiting sexual partners. Neuroscientists have speculated that the neural mechanisms underlying the motivating emotions of sexual pairing and childrearing also get recruited for other social bonding such as friendship. 21 Human studies have shown that oxytocin facilitates a temporary attachment between strangers, increasing trust, reciprocity, and generosity. 22 Anonymous charitable giving based on moral beliefs corresponds to activation of reward systems in fronto-limbic brain networks that are also activated by food, sex, drugs, and money. Such giving is also linked to networks that control the release of oxytocin and another neurohormone, vasopressin, also implicated in attachment between monogamous mammals and cohabiting sexual partners. One speculation emerging from this particular study is that the capacity to feel attachment to social causes such as donating to charity emerged from a co-evolution of genes and culture that allowed primitive reward and social attachment systems to operate beyond the immediate spheres of kinship, thus enabling human beings to form friendships, to trust and cooperate with strangers, and to directly link motivational value to abstract collective causes, principles, and ideologies. 23 The other primal motivation suggested by McDowell's example is moral disgust.
As well as feeling badly for a friend one has betrayed, one might very well feel disgust at oneself for betraying him. Humans share proto-disgust reactions with nonhuman animals, all showing distaste and nausea from exposure to potentially toxic foods and odors, and these reactions clearly have adaptive functions. 24 In humans, nonsocial disgust gets extended to the social realm, resulting in social disapproval, moralistic aggression, and willingness to punish moral norm violators even at significant cost to oneself. 25 While such moralized disgust can have a positive and even essential function in sustaining social cooperation, it quite possibly plays a role in primitive dislike of groups that are different from one's own, in physical appearance or in cultural norms.
Consider now an act that provokes both empathy for another to whom one is attached and disgust at the perpetrator of the act. The effect of these two combined primal motivations will be powerful. It may be no accident that human beings are often most effective in overcoming differences between each other when united against a common enemy. Consider Keneally's depiction of the terror Schindler felt for the victims of the Kraków liquidation combined with his nauseous reaction at the brutality with which the liquidation was carried out.
Related to this point is something that the real Schindler did say about his realization that he had to do something. In 1964 he was filmed by German television and was asked why he had intervened on behalf of the Kraków Jews. On one occasion, three SS men walked onto the factory floor without warning, arguing among themselves. "I tell you, the Jew is even lower than an animal," one was saying. Then, taking out his pistol, he ordered the nearest Jewish worker to leave his machine and pick up some sweepings from the floor.
"Eat it," he barked, waving his gun. The shivering man choked down the mess.
"You see what I mean," the SS man explained to his friends as they walked away. "They eat anything at all. Even an animal would never do that."
Another time, during an inspection by an official SS commission, the attention of the visitors was caught by the sight of the old Jew, Lamus, who was dragging himself across the factory courtyard in an utterly depressed state. The head of the commission asked why the man was so sad, and it was explained to him that Lamus had lost his wife and only child a few weeks earlier during the evacuation of the ghetto. Deeply touched, the commander reacted by ordering his adjutant to shoot the Jew "so that he might be reunited with his family in heaven," then he guffawed and the commission moved on. Schindler was left standing with Lamus and the adjutant. shuffling across the yard, waiting sickeningly for the bullet in his back that never came. 27 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a series of emotionally compelling experiences contributed to Schindler's conversion. These experiences helped to produce both a change in Schindler's motivation to save people from the Nazis and a change in
his beliefs about what he morally had to do. Sometimes people acquire new motivation to do what they previously believed they morally have to do. It might be thought that
Schindler's case fits this description because of his history of kindness and willingness to help others. 28 Schindler's history of kindness and willingness to help indicates a capacity for compassion that helped him to be receptive to the horrors he witnessed and enabled him to conclude that he had no choice but to try to help people who would be otherwise . 30 She distinguishes between "normative" altruism, which is helping behavior that is demanded, supported and reinforced by one's society, and "autonomous" altruism, which is helping behavior that is not socially demanded, supported, and reinforced. Her conclusion is that most Christian rescuers in Poland had autonomous motivation, and moreover that they displayed a sense of being socially marginal (a sense of not being fully integrated with one's environment but of standing apart from it) and a desire to help others based on values learned in the family. 31 Schindler certainly displayed a sense of marginality with respect to the Nazi authority structure, but his hard-drinking, womanizing, and abusive father hardly laid the groundwork for the "family values" that "conventional" motivations such as the desire to comply with social norms-e.g., awareness of one's friends and neighbors helping and fearing that they would disapprove if one did not also help, or thinking it important to listen to local authorities in the church or the resistance-and the desire to comply with religious norms-fear of God's punishment or thinking that Christians have a special obligation to protect Jews. Even those rescuers who cited motivations that would be labeled as more advanced or "postconventional" under Kohlbergian theory, such as the duty of democratic citizens to defend civil right and social justice, tested as cognitively "immature" in the sense that they tended to view justifications in terms of civic responsibility, rights and justice as having greater legitimacy than other sorts of justifications only when they agreed with the positions being justified. Gross suggests that reference to such justifications by some rescuers might reflect their socialization into democratic norms but not necessarily greater cognitive development in moral judgment. 34 
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Reflection on the varied results reported by Tec, Gross, and the Oliners supports the conclusion that circumstances strongly influenced the character profile of who became rescuers. In Poland, anti-Semitism was relatively intense and well entrenched;
Jewish rescue was not in generally socially reinforced, and moreover Nazi control of that country was stronger than in Western Europe (and even here the strength and nature of Nazi control varied nationally and even locally). In that context, it makes sense that there would be both fewer rescuers and that they would tend to display the sense of social marginality that Tec attributes to them. persuading the Gestapo to send these Jews to the factory camp "with regard to the continuing war industry production." She recalled that they found the railroad car bolts frozen solid, the men and women inside looking like emaciated skeletons and having to be carried out like so many carcasses of frozen beef. Throughout that night and many following, Emilie worked without halt on nursing them back from the brink, and most survived. 36 After the war, and after her separation from Oskar, Emilie lived in Buenos
Aires, alone and in poverty until a German Argentinean newspaper reporter wrote that while Oskar, "Father Courage," had not been forgotten, Emilie, "Mother Courage," had been. 
A Klansman's conversion
Here is another story involving a mixture of emotionally transformative experiences, continuities of character, other people who played important roles, and other situational factors that help turn a person in a morally better direction. It involves the agent's attitudes toward authority, but in this case the attitudes are substantially different from Schindler's. This is the story involves a friendship that developed between C. P.
Ellis, the Exalted Cyclops of the Durham, North Carolina Klavern of the Ku Klux Klan, and Ann Atwater, the most militant black woman in Durham. Of this pair of friends, I
concentrate on Ellis because his change was by far the most dramatic (which of course does not imply that Atwater was less admirable). The context in which Ellis' and Atwater's friendship developed was Durham's attempt to desegregate its public schools in the 1970's. Ellis and Atwater were elected to co-chair a charrette created to promote communication between black and white parents of a newly integrated school. Ellis more or less fell into this situation, not initially motivated by good will but more out of a desire to increase the respectability of the Klan, to keep an eye (and not a benevolent or helpful one) on the unfolding desegregation process, and to represent the "white" point of view.
Osha Gray Davidson's telling of Ellis' transformation includes an illuminating historical context that concerns the changing class structure of the Klan. 40 The Klan arose in 1866, created by white Southerners of the higher social classes. Its leaders needed the support of lower-class whites, and to get it they encouraged the perception that whites were united against a common enemy, that the KKK, for example, would protect their families from the blacks. 41 By the time Ellis found the KKK, the upper class whites found more respectable organizations to join. The KKK was left to lower-class whites sharing a past of poverty and failure and a common enemy. The Klan served as an extended family and offered the promise of better days with white supremacy. 42 That the Klan answered to a strong need in Ellis for acceptance and recognition is clear from a passage in which Davidson describes his feelings during the induction ceremony:
As he looked out at the rows of men welcoming him, he felt the old shame of poverty, failure, and purposelessness melt away. A lifetime of being an outsider was over. He felt blissfully submerged into a new and yet familiar community. The Klansmen were the descendants of failed farmers and broken mill hands just like himself. 43 
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Ellis not only found a home in the Klan, but also was surprised to find that others respected him, and as he gained confidence, he spoke out more forcefully. He fell into the leadership role rather than actively seeking it, but once he became the Exalted Cyclops, he concluded largely on his own that the Klan should not worry so much about secrecy and should start effectively communicating its views. He went to city council meetings to take the Klan public.
When he begins participating in the charrette, things do not begin harmoniously.
At the organizational meeting, C.P. shouts that the problem with Durham schools is "niggers." Ann Atwater shoots back that the problem is "stupid crackers like C.P. Ellis in
Durham." 44 The organizer of the meeting, Bill Riddick, perceives Ellis as "hurting and hurtful, possessed of all the tedious, creaking, accumulated hatreds of the South, and yet guileless and-Riddick believed-essentially honorable, Klansman or not." 45 After agreeing to co-chair the steering committee of the charrette with Atwater, Ellis has a revelatory diner meeting with Atwater:
That she was capable of sitting in a chair in a restaurant and eating food was a revelation to him. Ann had ceased being human to C.P. years before; she existed only as a symbol of everything he hated about her race. . . . But Ann doing something so ordinary as eating a meal in a restaurant-this was beyond C. P.'s powers of imagination. . . . He could hear the grinding of her teeth, feel the warmth emanating from her body. He sniffed, and swore he caught the scent of her hair. It certainly wasn't sexual attraction that churned inside of him, but it wasn't exactly disgust either. Unable to bear the confusion of feelings any longer, C.P. offered some excuse and hurried from the restaurant. 46 
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Davidson stresses Ellis' turmoil as he gets hostility from his fellow Klansman and as a teacher taunts his son for having a Klansman father who loves "niggers." In a meeting of the charrette, Ellis becomes particularly interested in the comments of a black woman who charges that teachers and the school administration treated her children as if they were stupid troublemakers. He had been about to say the same thing about his children, that they were treated badly because they were "poor white trash." This experience happened repeatedly throughout the day. For the first time, he really listened to black people and was stunned to hear, over and over, his own concerns coming from their mouths: "When arguments among kids erupted at school, it was the working-class children-black and white-who were always blamed and punished." 47 This led Atwater and Ellis to talking about how hard it was to raise children without much money, about how they were always having to tell their kids that they were just as good as kids from middle-class homes, to never to be ashamed of who they were.
At the same time Atwater and Ellis confessed to each other they had to hide their own shame about not being better providers. They talked about the teachers never letting their kids forget that they came from impoverished households. Their stories were so familiar that they could almost be interchangeable.
C.P. couldn't believe what he was hearing. But even more amazing to him was
what he was saying-and to whom. He was sharing his most intimate grievances, all of his doubts and failures, with the hated Ann Atwater. The militant he usually referred to with a sneer as "that fat nigger." And yet, here they were, talking like old friends. As if she wasn't black at all, or he wasn't white, or as if all that didn't matter. He looked at her and it was if he was seeing her for the first time. He was stunned by what he saw. Mirrored in her face were the same deeply etched lines of work and worry that marked his own face.
And suddenly he was crying. The tears came without warning, and once started, he was unable to stop them. Ann was dumfounded, but she reacted instinctively by reaching out and taking his hand in her own. She tried to comfort him, stroking his hand and murmuring, "It's okay, it's okay," as he sobbed. Then she, too, began to cry. 48 Ellis comes to the realization that it was not blacks who were holding poor whites down but wealthy white factory owners and businessmen, such as James "Buck" Duke, founding figure of Duke University. Ellis called for poor whites to unite against their real enemies, and with that, lost his place in the Klan.
As in the case of Schindler's witnessing of the vile and murderous acts of Nazis, emotionally transformative experiences seem to have played a key role in Ellis's conversion. Indeed, the evocation of emotion is the intended result of a charrette, conceived as a series of hours-long face-to-face meetings of a diverse group of people for the purpose of working out their differences. In organizing the Durham charrette, Bill
Riddick recognized that the "trick was to draw out people's deepest longings and fears, their frustrations and their dreams-while preventing these raw and antipodean emotions, once exposed, from combusting into violence." 49 It might be thought that Ellis's transformation as a result of these meetings was primarily cognitive and not emotionalcoming to believe that black people eat meals in restaurants just like white people; that black people's children are victimized in schools just like poor white people's children;
that both black and poor white parents feel shame for not being able to protect their found a community that accepted, respected, and then looked to him for leadership. In the charrette, Ellis in effect found a new community that recognized him as a leader and with whom he was able to share his "deepest longings and fears." Without that kind of experience, it is doubtful that the crucial changes in mere belief would have taken hold.
As in the case of Schindler, the character plays a crucial role in conversion. In contrast to Schindler and his relation to authority structures, what strikes one about Ellis is his earnestness, the evident satisfaction he got from the Klan as a kind of extended family, and his desire to earn respectability that appears in people who are denied respect.
Though Ellis might have seen himself as "socially marginal" in relation to respectable white society, he yearned for acceptance, not to manipulate authority structures to achieve his own ends. Before his conversion, his anger over his low status was directed at scapegoats in the black community, but Bill Riddick turned out to be right in seeing
Ellis as "guileless" and "essentially honorable." 50 Atwater and the other black parents in the charrette. Another might have noted the similarity but dismissed it by thinking that the black children and parents deserved the kind of treatment they got from the schools. Perhaps Ellis' decency and ability to see a black person, whom he had formerly saw only as a kind of alien being, now as another human being in much the same predicaments as himself. Finally, it must be said that Ellis' anger did not go away but got redirected more accurately at the upper reaches of Southern white society. Like Schindler, Ellis was capable of both compassion and moralized disgust. These are continuities of character that underlay Ellis' transformation.
There is also the set of situational factors that helped to set up this transformation.
Durham, along with the rest of the South was changing. Integration became inevitable, at least for those who could not afford to send their children to private schools or to move to parts of the metropolitan area where there weren't many black families. The national and local movements towards desegregation resulted in organization, infrastructure, and material resources that could be deployed by its leaders. In his outreach for respectability, it is not miraculous that Ellis could have become involved in this community effort to deal with desegregation. As indicated earlier, the social structure of the Klan was changing: the "higher-class" whites were more eager to distance themselves from working class whites, and thus increasing the possibility that someone as independent-minded as Ellis could see who was really keeping working class whites down. Unlike Wiesler in The Lives of Others, who seemed thoroughly a creature of the Stasi authority structure, and unlike Schindler, who was suited to manipulate authority structures for his own purposes, Ellis sought recognition and respect in a society whose authority structures were changing, and that allowed him to recognize the ways in which he and others like him had been used and deceived.
And there are others who played crucial roles in Ellis' transformation. Bill
Riddick, whom Davidson credits with acute psychologically perceptiveness and having extraordinarily persuasive powers, saw the honorableness in Ellis and first raised the possibility of having him co-chair with Ann Atwater. Riddick perhaps saw that Ellis would turn in a fundamentally new direction if he were given responsibility for making things go well. 51 Ellis' insights as to who was keeping whites like him down were prompted by events such as the time the black militant Howard Clement, to whom Ellis responded angrily at the meeting, spoke respectfully to Ellis after the meeting and wanted to shake his hand. This reminded Ellis of the fact that a white city councilman had talked strategy with him over the phone and secretly met with him but deliberately crossed the street in order to avoid having to publicly greet and shake hands with him. 52 Again in contrast, Joe Becton, a black city official, invited Ellis to meet publicly with him and in fact insisted that all interactions between the Klan leader and him occur in the open. And most of all there is Ann Atwater, who was extremely surprised to see Ellis afraid of attending a charrette meeting at a predominantly black school in a black neighborhood.
She of course was used to seeing the Klan as a terrorizing force, but when she realized that Ellis was concerned to be protected against black people, she reacted with humor instead of anger: "Don't you worry about that, C. P. I'll protect you." 53 And indeed, she did. When Ellis sets up an information table to distribute Klan literature at a school fair, and some black teenagers angrily threaten to destroy the exhibit, Ann comes over and in no uncertain terms turns them back.
It might be thought that in emphasizing the role of others in the individual's achievement of moral excellence, I am diminishing the role of personal responsibility. 54 If recognizing the role of personal responsibility simply means endorsing the idea that
individuals should do what is right for them to do even if others fail to do so, I can hardly dissent from such an idea. But I am skeptical that solemn reminders to "take personal responsibility" will have much effect on their own. Even the efficacy of conscious awareness of one's personal responsibility to do something may be overrated. If our moral upbringing has been adequate, much of the good we do will be habitual and unselfconscious. At a time of crisis when we ask ourselves what responsibilities we have, the efficacy of the answers we give to ourselves might crucially depend on our emotional responsiveness and which others are with us. I do not to deny that recognition of one's personal responsibility has a role in the achievement of moral excellence, but we would do well to recognize its limits and the fact that people can mutually support one another in taking responsibility.
The vision and habituated character that underlies moral conversion
To close, let me compare the tentative conclusions of these studies with a philosophical conception of moral conversion. This conception is that of vision that resources are relative to the circumstances in which they can be exercised. All this is so much more than overcoming selfishness and attaining clear vision.
So is moral conversion possible? My conclusion is that it is, and in ways that make it less mysteriously heroic but simply human, and still supportive of hope. I stress that it is hope that is warranted, not optimism, for the same kind of processes that result in a Schindler or an Ellis could produce conversion to moral vice rather than excellence.
Wiesler initially saw the meaning of his life in serving the East German regime. Ellis initially found his community and meaning for his life in the Klan. These points weigh against optimism, which is premised on the stance that the odds are on one's side. Hope 
